Post by Asairia on Feb 17, 2019 18:43:21 GMT
WORLD ASSEMBLY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
DELEGATE IS VOTING: FOR ✓
FINAL RESULTS:
13,019 (80.7%) FOR
3,121 (19.3%) AGAINST
Overview
Command Responsibility seeks to address the issue of military commanders and personnel not being held responsible for committing crimes forbidden or restricted by international (World Assembly) law.
About the Proposal
The author, Separatist Peoples of the International Democratic Union, has broken down this resolution into three key parts: one defining a commander and their duties; a second giving rights and duties to subordinates; and a third addressing member states and their duties on informing and guidelines on prosecuting commanders and subordinates for WA infractions.
Article I. Commander Duties
A “commander” is an individual with either de jure authority to control the conduct of members of an armed force, be it regular military, militia, irregular, or other form of paramilitary force, or de facto control of the same.
Commanders have an affirmative duty to prevent or punish their subordinates for violating World Assembly law regulating conduct during armed conflict.
Commanders are criminally liable for:
a. ordering any act in knowing contravention of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict, or
b. failing to take necessary action to prevent or punish subordinate violations of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict where the commander knows or has information that allows them to conclude that their subordinates were about to or had contravened those World Assembly laws.
No member state may permit a commander to retain any command after a court martial determines their dereliction of the above duties, notwithstanding other criminal penalties.
Nothing in this article precludes member states from independently enforcing higher military conduct standards for commanders.
Article II. Subordinate Rights and Duties
A subordinate has an affirmative duty to refuse any order from any commander that is manifestly illegal under World Assembly law.
A subordinate who complies with a commander’s reasonable interpretation of an arguable question of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict is not criminally liable for contravening that law, unless there is sufficient evidence that the subordinate knew or should have known that the order was unlawful.
A subordinate who relies in good faith on a commander’s incorrect or misleading knowledge of a situation or other facts may raise that reliance as a partial or total defense against their contravention of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict, unless there is sufficient evidence that the subordinate knew or should have known the actual facts of the situation. Prior failures of military intelligence or situational awareness alone do not constitute sufficient evidence.
No member state may penalize subordinates who refuse, in good faith, to obey an order of uncertain legality under World Assembly law regulating conduct during armed conflict, even if the order is legal in hindsight. Member states will take all prudent steps to treat evidence or investigations of a subordinate's lawful refusal under this Article as privileged information, and may not include it in a subordinate's service record.
Article III. Member State Duties
Member states must routinely train and educate their military personnel about their rights and obligations under World Assembly law regarding military action.
Member states must interpret the language of this resolution liberally where necessary to effectuate the policy goals of holding commanders and soldiers accountable for their actions and disincentivizing culpability in war crimes.
Nothing in this resolution bars the World Assembly from defining the parameters of command responsibility for different violations of World Assembly law, provided those parameters further the goals of accountability for violation and incentives to obey international law.
A “commander” is an individual with either de jure authority to control the conduct of members of an armed force, be it regular military, militia, irregular, or other form of paramilitary force, or de facto control of the same.
Commanders have an affirmative duty to prevent or punish their subordinates for violating World Assembly law regulating conduct during armed conflict.
Commanders are criminally liable for:
a. ordering any act in knowing contravention of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict, or
b. failing to take necessary action to prevent or punish subordinate violations of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict where the commander knows or has information that allows them to conclude that their subordinates were about to or had contravened those World Assembly laws.
No member state may permit a commander to retain any command after a court martial determines their dereliction of the above duties, notwithstanding other criminal penalties.
Nothing in this article precludes member states from independently enforcing higher military conduct standards for commanders.
Article II. Subordinate Rights and Duties
A subordinate has an affirmative duty to refuse any order from any commander that is manifestly illegal under World Assembly law.
A subordinate who complies with a commander’s reasonable interpretation of an arguable question of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict is not criminally liable for contravening that law, unless there is sufficient evidence that the subordinate knew or should have known that the order was unlawful.
A subordinate who relies in good faith on a commander’s incorrect or misleading knowledge of a situation or other facts may raise that reliance as a partial or total defense against their contravention of World Assembly law regarding conduct during armed conflict, unless there is sufficient evidence that the subordinate knew or should have known the actual facts of the situation. Prior failures of military intelligence or situational awareness alone do not constitute sufficient evidence.
No member state may penalize subordinates who refuse, in good faith, to obey an order of uncertain legality under World Assembly law regulating conduct during armed conflict, even if the order is legal in hindsight. Member states will take all prudent steps to treat evidence or investigations of a subordinate's lawful refusal under this Article as privileged information, and may not include it in a subordinate's service record.
Article III. Member State Duties
Member states must routinely train and educate their military personnel about their rights and obligations under World Assembly law regarding military action.
Member states must interpret the language of this resolution liberally where necessary to effectuate the policy goals of holding commanders and soldiers accountable for their actions and disincentivizing culpability in war crimes.
Nothing in this resolution bars the World Assembly from defining the parameters of command responsibility for different violations of World Assembly law, provided those parameters further the goals of accountability for violation and incentives to obey international law.
My Decision
War crimes are an abhorrent aspect of war that has plagued the world for centuries. Every attempt should be made to prevent them from occurring, and this resolution does just that.
Under this resolution, subordinates will have the full backing of the international community to refuse orders given to them by commanders who either knowingly or unknowingly direct action to be taken that may be in direct violation of international law. In the past, failure to carry out your orders was not only seen as cowardly, but would more often than not result in a court martial for insubordination regardless of whether or not the orders given were right or wrong. Now, soldiers everywhere have the immunity and authority necessary to do what they know is right.
Sometimes violations of World Assembly law are unavoidable, especially when fighting terrorists or rogue nations who fight from often unvacated civilian buildings. Because of this and the realization that you aren't always fighting uniformed enemies, I am relieved to see that there are avenues of legal help should an unfortunate violation occur without it being known or intended at the time.
Furthermore, the opposition's argument that this resolution will do nothing but increase disobedience in military ranks through the second-guessing of orders is utter rubbish. Professional militaries should be more than capable of implementing and enforcing this resolution once it's enacted.
All in all, this resolution sets firm responsibilities and liabilities on those who knowingly and willingly break World Assembly law while also being protective of those that seek to do what is right or legitimately meant no harm at the time. I have cast my vote in favor of this resolution, and I encourage you to do the same.
Current Regional support at time of publication.
Current Delegate support at time of publication.